Currency boards are at one end of the spectrum between monetary policy credibility and monetary policy flexibility. They maximize the commitment to stable policy at the expense of all ability to tailor monetary conditions to macroeconomic and financial circumstances. Governments which attach a high shadow price to credibility are attracted to this option. For example, at the beginning of the 1990s, Argentine policymakers, burdened by their country's succession of failed battles with inflation and prepared to take drastic steps to establish their anti-inflationary credibility, resorted to a currency board. Estonia, Lithuania and eventually Bulgaria were attracted to the arrangement by the special monetary difficulties of the transition to the market and, in the first two cases, of proximity to an unstable Russia.
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Whether their examples should be emulated by other countries is a contested issue. Although currency boards were advocated for Russia following the disolution of the Soviet Union and for Mexico following its financial meltdown in 1995, in both cases there was also resistance to the proposal, and policymakers ultimately shunned the arrangement on the grounds that they could not afford the sacrifice of policy flexibility it entailed. Unfortunately, systematic empirical analysis of these issues is difficult. While all countries are special, the circumstances of those that have opted for currency boards tend to be so unusual as to render hazardous all attempts at generalization. Most modern currency boards are so recent or short-lived that there exist only a very few years of time-series data on their operation, affording little opportunity for systematic econometric work.
Here is where the case of Hong Kong's currency board comes in. Hong Kong operated a currency board vis-a-vis sterling from 1935 through the early 1970s, at which point the instability of sterling led it to sever that link.
It then floated until 1983, when the turbulence associated with negotiations 2 with China over the colony's future led to a confidence crisis, to which the government responded by reestablishing the currency board, this time with a peg to the U.S. dollar. Thus, the last two decades divide into a pair of tenyear periods, one of floating and one featuring a currency board, over which the comparative performance of alternative monetary arrangements can be analyzed and compared. Whether investors have an incentive to run on the Exchange Fund's reserves by shifting out of domestic-currency deposits in favor of U.S. dollar deposits depends on the monetary policy they expect to be pursued in the aftermath of the event. If they think that policy will be more inflationary than before, they have an incentive to attack. This could be the case if they anticipate that the Chinese government will under certain circumstances compel
This last-mentioned situation is modelled by Obstfeld (1986) . 6. See for example Erkel-Rousse and Melitz (1995) .
7. Interestingly, this is precisely what Tam Bayoumi and I (1996) found on the supply side when estimating the same model using annual data for the industrial countries spanning the last 100 years: short-run aggregate curves grow flatter over time, as if nominal rigidities grow more important. But we also found that aggregate demand curves grew steeper, as more and more countries moved in the direction of greater exchange rate flexibility to facilitate the use of demand management policies to offset the effects of supply disturbances, which increasingly affect output as the short-run aggregate supply curve grows flatter.
